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Chapter I
The Ecstasy of Time Travel in Werner
Herzog's Cfrve of Forgatten Dreams
William Day
ln Stanloy Cavell's oxtersive eeilvre on films and film theory, very littlr
is said atrout the documentary. Cavell's wlitings address mosttry classical
l'Iollywood cinema of the 1930s and 1940s, though there are also remarks
r'*nging from single sentences to full-lledged readings of tilrns sketching
lcross [he cinernatic canon liom the beginning to the end qrf the last century.
llut the atrsence of explicit wridngs by Cavell on nonfictiorr film (with one or
lwo exceptions) t$rn$ ()ut not to mattcr much [<rr tho present discussion on the
tkrcumentary as corsidered through Cavell's writings. This is bocause, on his
vicw, to weigh the meaning of "documentary film" is perhaps already to he
wc:ighing one word too meny: "every movie has a documentary basis," as he
srys in rernarking on the use of documentary footage in Du.{an Makavejev's
lineet Movie (1974).r Cavell underscores this documentary basir by remind-
ing us of "the camerans ineluctatrle interrogation of th* natural endowment
rrl'the actors." But one can add more generally that film, whose m,tterial
hasis Cavell identifies as "a suefie*$ion of automatic world prqiectians,"2car-
rics out its magic hy reproclucing the world automatically, rnd so invariahly
tkuumcnts ($ome pert o0 the world and its inhrhitants. I spoak here only
ol' films that arc made in this way, and will not be cr:nsidering alternative
nlcan$ o[:creatifig mr:ving images-neither thase means that date from enrly
in nrrrvic histoqy (such as animation) nor more recent alternative techniques
(sucrh ls CGJ).
'l'hus I hegin with the thuught that one cnn characterize, if not define, docu-
nr('nlirry {ilm us (hat gonre o[ {ilnmaking thut lays bare rhe fact of alt film.(':rvcll numes this tirct by saying that lilm prc$ent$ "a worlql I know, and see,
lrrrt to wlriclr I um ne vcrthclcss not prtscnt," thal is, "a world past."] rffhile('itvell's eluirrr is no[ momrt tu hc takcn a{ laco valuc, as wc will sce shortly,
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the idea that the world we find in the movie theater is inevitably past already
suggests why it is that the documentary, and fiIm generally, seems to revel
in the fragility of the momentary, in the intimation of a secret contained in
the unrehearsed, the spontaneous, the aleatory. Watching a film with inter-
est often means joining in the camera's delight in the chance happening, the
"blink and you miss it" passing event. It is as if we take the measure of our
lives from such transitory moments; they reveal our fate.
But wllat is it to "know, and see, , . . a world past"? What is our fascination
with the cinematic world, whose "only difltrence from reality" is that it "does
not exist (now)"?aWhy be interested in reality only insofar as it rs past? We
might try to answer these questions by saying that our real interest in fllm lies
in preserving a world past. That is no doubt part of the motivation behind cer-
tain archival uses of moving pictures-the ethnographic study, for example,
or the home movie or iPhone video. If we say that {ilm "preserves" a world
past, we tie our interest in film-*or, perhaps better: our interest in film's
metaphysical basis-to our interest in artifacts like fossil records, mummies,
death masks, relics, perhaps even DNA coding. Andrd Bazin famously draws
on such analogies to specify the nature of liIrn's realism, which he describes
as "the preservation of life hy a representation of lif'e."s If one were to take
one's cue from this collection of analogies, then the interest of film, and
a fortiori of the documentary, would be that it preserves aspects of the world
for future contemplation or understanding, so as not to lose those aspects of
the world to the ravages of time.
But while film may carry artifactual interest, the interest of artifacts is not
everywhere preservationist. Consider Rohert Gardner's documentary I'or-
est of Bliss (1986) and its presentation of a ritual cremation in India" When
Cavell, writing about this film, proposes cremation as one of this film's many
allegories of the camera's life, he sees in it not a ritual of preservation but, in
his words, "a ritual ligured as transfiguration itself." The lesson Cavell draws
from this implication ol Gardner's Forest of Bliss is thal "film is the mediurn
of transfiguration . . . blossed or cursed with the fate, in the same gestures, to
destroy and recreate everything it touches."6In "More of The World Viewed,"
Cavell is at pains to explain the nature of this transfigurative power of film;
his struggle there is to avoid the misunderstanding that the significance of
the filmed world is its m,ere pastness. The experience of watching a movie
on a screen in an otherwise dark room is fbr Cavell not an experience of the
world preserved so much as that of the world raised or transfigured (and not
by being raised into the realm o1'fiction):
My intuition js that fictionality docs not de$cribe tho narative or dramatic mode
of fllm^ . . . I think the rnodc is morc closcly bouncl to tho nrylhologictl thun it
is to tho lictional. . . .
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When I say that the audience in a movie house is preseRt at something that
has happened, I do not wish to imply that the events on the screen have taken
place, as it were, in real life, northat they are inevitably set in the past . . ,: How
can one be present at something that has happened, that is over? . , . To speak
ofbeing present at something that is over is not to state a falsehood hut, at best,
to utter a paradox" . . . My repeated emphasis on such notions as the projected
world's not existing . . . are meant to correct, or explain (o1'course, mythologi-
cally to con'ect or explain), what is wrong and what is right in the idea of thc
pastne$s of the projected world. I relate that idea most immediately to my pas-
siveness hefore the exhibition o1'the world, tei the fascination, the uncannincss,
in this chance to view the manit'estation of the world as a whole.T
My airn in this chapter is to tbllow this collection of thoughts evoking the
"paradox" in the experience of lilm generally-the paradox, nanrely, thut it
is an experience of being present at something that has happened, $omething
that is over. But I will not be taking the path forged by Cavell's idea that "filnr
is a moving image of skepticism."s l have no doubt of the importance o1' that
claim fbr identifying a motivation behind our fascination with reality pro-
jected and screened. By saying that I will off'er a dillerent path, I do not meun
that the sense of otherworldliness and uncanniness that skepticism trades in
will be left very far behind. But I note that Cavell's words-his description
of a paradox inherent in the experience of film-play on the sound o1'a para-
dox that, in the most straightfbrward sense, is a paradox not of skepticism
but o1'time. It is true that when we speak ol'being present at sclmething thut
is over-_when we speak of being in the grip of a movie-the paradox this
exprosses is not captured by the traditional philosophical paradoxes ol'timc
dating back to Zeno and unraveled by Aristotle, Augustine, and othcrs. Thc
cinematic paradox arises not so much in our ways o1'talking about time us
in our experience of it. Ancl it is as experience that the cinematic paradux
leads me to ask whether we would be better off, as film theorists, iI'we drcw
the comparison between film and artifacts the other way around. Instearl
of understanding film's peculiar transfigurations by analogy to practicas ol'
preserving the past-cremation, mummification, and so on-what might
we learn if we tried to understand our interest in fr:ssils records or mum-
mies or DNA coding by analogy to our intcrest in film, or to our fascination
with being present to "a world past" given to us in film? In the next seotion
I examinrl three pre-cinematic descriptions ol'relations tcl timc-in Emcrson,
Thoreau, ancl Weil-that anticipate the paradr:x ol' timc inhcrent in lilm.
What we learn l'rom that exarnination will be put to usc iu thc suhsequcnt und
Iinal section, wher"e thc achicvcment of Werncr Herzog's Catte rt' Forgrtvn
Dream,s, ostensihly a lilrn ahout prchistolic cavc paintings, will hc srcn l.o
lie not in its dtrumentatiun ol'a Limc past hut in it$ liheriltion ol'thc prrJsont,
lockcd-in-placc rrx)mcnt.
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THE ECSTASY OF T1ME TRAVET
The textual passages we will be considering in this sectioo are not explicitly
about the peculial paradox of time that arises in our experience of film. But
they nonctheless describe similar experiences of time, or attitudos one might
take toward time, that parallel our experience of cinematic time. They thereby
cast Iight on the cinematic experience of a world past, revealing it as the expe-
rieuce of a particular kind ol'wonder-what I will want to call philosophic
wonder.
The {irst textuai passage is taken from Ralph Waldo Emerson's "History,"
the opening essay in his 1840 coilection flssays.' First Series. As in virtually
every essay written hry Emerson, in this one he attompts to alter or reroufe
our unexamined relation to our own experience. Emerson's topic in "His-
tory" is the experience we have in considering and reflecting on the past,
specifically on the historical and prehistorical past"*-the past as we come to
it preserved in books, in artilacts, in bones, in rocks. We are prone to think
that in such physical forms the past is preserved simply" without cinematic
or other paradoxes of tinre, since we ancl tl'le recorcl wo examine are simply
present to one another. I hold the book, I examine thrl geological outcrop, and
my el1brt appears to be to understand, not sometlring ahout the present that
I and the record occupy, hut son:ething about the past. My wish :is ta go there:
the distance between prosent and past is the barrier to the pasq that distance
must be overcome.
Yet it is precisely this understanding ol"'the past" that Emerson calls "wild,
$avage, and preposterous." To correct it, he draws our attention to the char-
acter of the time we experience when we are reflecting on the past (a time he
designates "the Here and the Now"). He begins his recalibration o1'the mean-
ing of the past hy considering the archaeologist at work in the lleld:
[Giovannil Belzoni digs arrd measures in the mummy-pits and pyrarnids of
Thebes. untii he can see the end ol the difl'erence between the monstrous work
and hirnself. When he has satisfied himself'" in general and in detail, that it was
made by such a persorl as he, so armed and so motived, and 1.o ends to r.vhich he
himself should also have worked, the problem is solved; his thoLrght lives along
the whole line of temples and sphinxes and catacomhs, passes through them all
witlr satisl'action, and they live again to the mind. ar ate n,or,v.')
Studying the past-contemplating the peoplc who livccl thcn-is not an
experience of time travel as orclinarily inragined (c.g., nry lcuving "thc llcrc
and the Now" to go back to "Thcrc ancl 'fhcn"), hul ruthcr an r.:xpcricncc ol'
cloublencss, o1'l.wo rcgislcls ol'tirr-rc. Our irrraginiug ol'thr: pas( hirs signili-
cil"lc:c l'lot as a singullr"ity hut irs il conl[)ilt.irtivc: it involvcs r.lxltr:ric:ncirrg tlrl,r'
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moment lransfigured in the wake of that (the past). The people who populittrr
the past, as marked lry their books or bones, are present trt us in oLtr wtty ol
conceiving their ways o1'being in the wodd. We do not travel back ttt tltonl
they travel ahead to us. Our experience of this rnoment olidenti fication iurtl
insight-"they live again in the mind, or are nor,"**is what gives "prcsorvirrg
the past" whatever sense it has if it is not to mean a shelving of the past, it wity
ol putting the past in its place as "what was."
In "The American Scl'lolar," Emerson provides us with a rclattod nucount
of tho translormation that happens as we consider and reflect on orlr own,
pcrsonal past. I{ere is Emerson's description of the process whcrcby our ltits(
actions become our present thought:
The actions and events ol our childhood ancl youth, are now fitattats ol citlrtt.
est observation. They lie like lair pictures in the air. Nol so with out fcc:t:ttl
actions,-with the business which we now have in hancl. On lhis wc trcr tlttih.'
unat"rle to specr-rlate. Our af'lbctions as yet circulatc through it. . . . 'l'ltc ttt w
deed is yet a part ol life,-rernains lbr a time immersed in our urrcunscious lilir.
In sonre contemplative hour it detaches itself from thc lil'c like r rip* li'uil, lo
become a thought of the mind. Instantly it is raisecl, transfigulccl; (ho cot'rultlihlr'
has put on incomrption. Hencetbrth it is an obiect ol'beauty, htlwcvrrt base ils
clrigin and neighborhood.ri)
Where the Empiricists describe the work of memory as a Inorc copying ol'
original and more vivid sensory experiences, Enierson rcversos thoit' e lirirtt.
'Io hring the past into the present by remembering it is not a clinrinislttttr:nl
o['the original experience, a second-best. Rather, Ii:r Emerson, cotttolttplitt.
irrg the past is a way of taking it in, or on, that the original exporicncc irr ils
livcliness could not (logically or grammatically) provide. Somothirrg likt'
this transligurative power ol ruminative thought is known by many nan)c:s
rucross the mottled history of philosophy: as Plato's doctrine of rccollcc:l.iort
ot urwnrrcsis; for Hegel, as thc achievement of We ltgeist in coming to know
itsclf'; kx'Freud, as tlre hasis atrd presumption of the psychoanalytic nrctltod.
llu( we should nol allow the interiection o{'inlluential na.mcs and thcorics lo
rlistracl us lrom Emer$on's singr"rlar image, thal what we aro now doing will
";rrrt on incorruption" in hcr-:ornirlg thought. His idea is not that tltoughl,,; trc
irrcorruptihlc, the naturc ol'a thought is that it passcs ("a passing thotrglrt"),
llis iclca is that c<xrtemplatirrg tlrc past-.say, thirrkirrg hack t<t llro nrotttr,ttl
wc (irst rcad llmcrson's very worcls, "thc lrrrsirrcss" wc thon had lilt:l'rrlly
"irr lrancl"*-is an cxpcricncc that is ncither in thc tirnc ol'Lhc plsl c[rctl rror'
Ioclicrl in thc plcscnt lTlonront ol'tlrc rccollc:ction, hut sits btrstt'irlc tltc lwo. Ort
(lris irccor"rrrt, to lollcct on iin(l's own l)ust is Lo bc lillcrl orrt ol'littirr irlto;lrrlltcr,
into thc rc-,ulru ol'(lrc: irrcrlrrupliblc.
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Wirat a monlent ago I charactcrized as an expericnco of doutrleness-the
human ability tr: intirse the present mfinent with the vitality of another
mofllent so that they mary in an instant, somewhere beyond our ordinary,
one-dimensional sense of time-is not lar lrom the mood r:1' a paragraph in
Henry David Thoreau's Wo,Lden, in the middle oi his chapter titled "Soli-
tude." It reads:
With thinking we may be beside ourselve s in a sane sense. Ry a conscious elTolt
r,r['the mind we can stand aloof liorn actions and their coil$equences. . . . I only
know niyself as a huma,n entity; the sccile, so to speak, of thoughts and afl'ec-
tions; aud arn sens:ible of a cefiain doubleness by wlrich I can stanil a$ remote
lir:rn uiysell as i'rom aunther" However intense my erperience, I am conscior"rs
of the presence ancl criticisnr of a part nl me, which, as it were, is r.rot a pafi of
me, birt spectator, sharing no experience, bLrt taking noLe of it, and ihat is no
rnore I than it is you.rl
lf we take our cue I'rom Cavell and read this remark as answering tti a threat
of shepticism-specifically, io the skeptic's cloubting the possibility o{'human
action per se--then what this double or spectator shows us is, according to
Cavell, "a mode of what [Thoreaul calls 'bcing interested in."'r2Beyond your
selfl, caught in the midst of' your experience, Thoreau reminds you of the
possibility of n spectator-self "beside" you, "taking noto o{'' the experience
lihe a spectator at a play. What yoLl achieve by this conscions act of doutrling
yoursclf is a kind oi'unseifconscious sell'-awareness-your right, in Cavell's
phrase, "to take an interest irr your own experience."rl
Cavell asserts thaL Walderu sometimes calls this spectatorial clouble "the
imagination," thereby casting this spectntor in the role of specter.raBut that
rnay be a too hasty reading nn Cavell's part, given the arnbiguity in Thi:reau's
lurther descriplion of this mindlirl achievement.In Wolden, Thoreau conLin-
ues: "When fhe piay, it may bc the tragedy, of life is over, the spectator goes
his way. It was a kind ol fiction, a work of the irnagination only, so far as he
was concerned."ls Thoreau seenls to he saying that it is rry ltfe that is imag-
ined fiom the point o1' view of this dispassionate spectator-self. Then who is
doing the imagining, and who is being imagined? Perhaps the sense is: when
thrclugh a conscinus elfofi you consider yoursell'fiom a remote standpoint,
what you are considering is a shitdow play of yourseli': sr:mething that, like
a shadow, is objective and perceivable but also insubstantial and ephemcral.
That is one reading. But I understand Thoreau to he saying sorlrcthing else,
and something not distant fiom Emcrson's earlicr thought. Wherr t:nc is sim-
ply ln time, taking expcrience as it comcs, aninral-likc, ono is as yet unroal-
izecl, and so "a kincl ol'fiction." In thc compctition liit'uty attonl.ion**(lrat
is, hetwecn nry ahsurpLion or subsurrtption iu thc scorrcs ol'rrry lilc iurcl tny
lincling intr.rost irr thosc sc(:ncli ls sl.rtrcllttol llrc rrtorr t'ror:('ssilry, tlrc rrtorr":
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helplul and neighborly, standpoint is the ref'lective one, in whiclt I stittrrl
next to time but not in it. Such a descripticin tits Lhe predominant ltroorl ol
Thoreau's "Solitude," in which society is flot to be I'ound in "tlre rlcpol. llrr'
post-office, the barroom, the rneeting-house"--in the "outlying anel tt'ittrsit'ttl
circurnstances" of a lif'e as it is lived.16To see these as "essential lo il ri(rrr'n(:
and healthy lif'e" is to sufTer what Thoreau calls "a slight insanily.'"r/'l'ltt'
rellective or doublilrg stanelpoint, contrariwise, where one is hcsiclc ortr:sr'll'
sanely, will find its society in what Thoreau calls "the percnnial sor.rrcc ol our'
li{'e"; and the prospect of awakening to lif"e, he says, "makcs intlil'lcrcrrt rrll
times and p1aees""18It lbllows that to consider one's existencc lhrrt llrr,: slrrtrrl-
point that Thoreau charactcrizecl as being flext to onrl sclf, "whcrc: tltc grirttrlcsl
laws are continually being executed," is to neighhor titne as wcll.r"'l'ltorr'iru
is, one could say, giving the phenomenological evidencc iot it notrtrctlrl lrt'r'
spective oR our intuition o1'time, and on our Iives, suggestittg tltitt oLrr litrtr'
hound perspective is unexamined. perhaps imaginecl, and cr:rtitirtly lritrt iirl.
A third and final desc,ription of the doubling o1'timc is skolchr"rrl irt Sirrrorrt'
Weii's Gravity antl. Grace, particularly in thc hriol'antl rr:nttu'kithh.: clritplt'r'
"Rcnunciation o1'Time." Despire the titls o{'thr: chapl"cr (whiclt is rtot ltt't's).
Weil asks not that one renounca all, of time hut s<.lnrethittg.itrs( slroll ol ltll.
One is urged to renounce past ancl future: tcl ahandon, lttorc sllt:i'i lir'irlly, llrc
scll-deception of imaginir-lg lime as a place and a possibility clil'lr:rtrrl Irrrrrr
what the present can promise. The past and tutr"rrc o1'thc inrirg,inlrliorr iui'
shades or blinds to one's sensing reality: "The imaginati<ln, (illcr ttp ol lltc
void," shr; writes, "is essentialiy a liar."?('For Weil, thcrc is u r"c;rcly i'tttt' lirt
thr: habitual imagining ol a better time past or to conte, and l.lur( is to srrlli't
wilh an intensity that can wipe out all thoughts ol'past or l'uturc (:onll)('n
satiorr. Such intense suffbring also, against all expectalittn, itllows ()llc lo
stracldlc the door that opens onto eternity:
'fhc past and the luture hindcr the wholcsome cl'l'cct of ol'lliction hy prrrvirlirrp
an unlirnitecl tielcl lbr irrraginary clevation. Tlrat is why tlro rcrrutrciutiott ol' ;lirsl
lnd l'Lrtur-c is the lirsl ol'all rctlunciations.
'l-he prescnt does not altain linalily. Nor clocrs thc lr.rture, lill it is orrly wlral
will be prossnt. Wo clo nol hnow this, lutwgvcr. il'wo apply to tltc Jrrcsr:tt( lltc
point o['that closirc wilhin us whiclr corrcsponcls to lirurlity" it pir"rrctrs riltlrl
lhlorrgh to lhc otcrnal.
Whcn pain and wcarincrss rcaclr thc point ol'causing o $cns('ol'pt:r';tclrtity lo
hr, holrr irr t.ho soul, thror,rgh crtutcntyrlating tlris pr-rrpr-rtuity witlt itcccptlrttcc ltttrl
Iovc, wc arc sna(ctrl:d awiry into rllcilrity.rl
Wi:il dcscribcs irn cxlroriorrc(, ril lirrrcr. -clcirtly n()t irn tv.llorisrtcr: srlrtplrl hy
rrll irr corrtlust to wlrich, lrgirin, Llrr: thrlrrght ol'trirvt:lirtp, rttrt rtl llrc ptt'strrtt
rrrourct)t's llirirr irnrl irrlo solntr lirttn'tr clcrtrity, ir ('()nllx'nslrlirtf ittttrtortirlity, is
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revealed as clelusional. The sense of the eternai is not to be experienced in
the future, or ever, if it is nr:t discoverable through the dawning of an aspect
o1 the present. The aim of Weil's devotional life is not ttl suff"er tbr the sake
of su{fering. Rather, intense suffering allElws the present moment lo reveal
to one's experience what the reality o{'the oternal waits upon: achieving the
perspective of eternity requires simply that I renounce the thoughl that there
is snme (other) time when I will gain it.
Weil's "renunciation of time" can seem at oilds with the attitude towarciil
time that makes renunciation so much as possible-*l mean the aspiration to
abandon one's past and to change, the commitment to one's better or higher
self, what Emersur at one place names ono's "unat[ained hut attainable
sel{'""22Being inspired by a vision of a dift'erent tuture sell is at least half of
the motivation in Cavell's narrative of rnoral perl'ectionism.23That vision of
another self for one's self serves [o balance the other, initiating half of that
mood-the otherwise nverwhelming $ense of disapprlintment or disgust in
one's present se11.In Cities ofWords, Cavell highlights the aspiral'ional hall
of the nroverrent to a next self when he sa.ys, "what [moral] perf'ectionism
propo$es [isl that no state of the self achieves its f'ull expression, that the
late of finitude is to want, that human desire projects an idea of an unending
beyond."2aBut that is, again, but half of the realization that can set tl'le soul
in motion. Elsewhere Cavell joins Weil try bringing inta view the clarity of
thoughtthatthepresentinstantpresents: "Each, stateof theself is,sotospeak,
Iinal: each state constitutes a world (a circle, Emerson says) and it is one oach
one also desires. . . . On such a picture ol the sell'one could say hoth that
signilicance is always del'emed and equal.ly that it is never del'erred (there is
no later circie until it is drawn)."2s Taken together, these two passages lrom
Cavell suggest that an ideal, or at least a helpl'ul, conception o1' the Here-
and-Now is that orre is receptive both to one's attained sell (its expression
o{'one's self) and lo one's unattained selI'(or how one's present self always
ialls short of expressing itsell'i. The moral is that i1'yiiu claim the right "to
take an interest in your own experience," then when you are ahsorhed in your
present experience (whether it afflicts you, as in Weil, or disgusts you, as in
Nietzsche,26 ol enraptures you, as can happen in the cinema), you are ttl give
up the iclea that the redemption o1 your prosent (seli) lies elsewhere, at some
other time.
It each of the flrregoing texts hy Emerson, Thoreau, attd Wcil, we are
given cause to distrust our ordinary unclerstanding o{'the pnst. Ernerson, {or
example, undermines our sense that the past harbclrs knowledgc r.rl'itscll that
is both ideral and metaphysically inaccessihlo to us. Wc arc givcn caltse as
well to clistrust oul: sensc ol'tho prcsent as l'ixcd dctcrminisLically betwcon
past and ['utrtrc; ThrtrcaLr, lilr ins(lutco, urtclcrntitrcs our licllsc that wc itrc
crcatLlros incvitably or r,:hronicirlly situatc:cl itt thc ttnstollptthlc, silcrtt sli;-rpagc
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of time. And wrl are given cause to distrust olu' lcvcronce 1'or: the past and tltt:
luture; Weil, for example, undermines ollr scnsc ol'lta"r over the prcl'icllll, ils
if it waits to ensnare us, so that we think the hettcr alternative woulrl hc trt
escape it by means of the irnagination. Taken together, these texts rotttittr.l tts
of our cognitive possibility to consider ourselves, or transport oursclvos, ttltl-
side of tirne. They thereby illuminate how the popular lantasy of'tinte travtrl
(our wish to "travel through" tirne) not only misses in what way tritvclittg
through time is our ordinary mode of lil'e (what we otherwise cirll -'livirrg")
but amounts to a wish to kill time, or to abort the present. lt is onc ol'crrttttttk:tis
lantasies that humans devise to avoid the pregnancy of (imc itscl[:-'l'antlsics
that allow us to ovedook the possibilities, beytlnd sciencs fictittn, ol'occttpy-
ing two times at once. Each of these writers (and the traditir:n (hcy cxcrtr;rlily,
stretching ba,ck to Plato) reconceives the human desirc to sl.cJl ttut ol'litntr.
'They accomplish this hy revealing and nurturing through languitgc itlt itttr,:trrsl
in experiencing lacets of the present momeilt that clil'lbr lhrrtt l.hc ordittitt'y,
immersed, unr"eflective sense o1' time.
HARZOG'S CAVE OIT TORGOTTTN DITEAMS
Il', as I claim above, theso descriptions ol'cxperiencing l'irccts ol'tltc ltrr:sr.rttl
moment are literary preoufsot's or equivalents to thc cxpcrioncc ol'"'a wot'ltl
past" in film, then a part of our fascination wi[h that world itlvolvcs its ltowct'
to place us outside our clrdinary, imrnersecl, nnrclloctivc rclation to (itttr.
(l think of tliis claim, arising tiom the "paradox" in thc cxporicncc ul'liltrt.
rl()t as competing with but as standing alongside Cavell's discovery thtrt lilrtr
is "a moving image of skepticism," by which he means that lilnr satislios ottt'
irrtcrest to view the world in private and unseen, mechanically displacod liotrt
il.??) I do not mean to say that the experiencc of lilm a.utomatk:olLv clisplai:cs
Lrs l'rom our ordinary relation tr: time. It is a metaphysical ['act tltat, wlrcn wc
watch a. movie, wc are present at sonrething that has happenecl; hut u givon
lilrnmal<er may chu:se tr: bring out (draw on or exploit) this l'act, or ttot.
ln tlre light oi thc prcvious section's cliscovcrics ahout literary antcccd-
cnts to thc way cincma clisplaccs titne, wc tnight concltlclc that itn cscitpis(
nrovic-il'therc is such a kintl ol'movic-is rrril cxpklitittg tlris nrctapltysir.:;tl
l'irct at thc heart ol" [ilm. Whal tlre tcxts cxarninccl abovc: prornisc is ttot, ils
witlr escapist rnovics, a way to cs('(Lp( lhe prescn,t-trt livc itt tltc itnaginittitlt
irr iurothcr tirrrc, whcthcr pust or'[irtr"rc"--"hut u wi]y l"o cscirl)L: titttc, or stty it
ccltirin Intalist vicw ol'thc prcscnt, hy inviting us to givo ttt"ttsrrlvcs ()vor Io
ollrc:l'possihilitics ilrhcrcnt in ths proricnt. Wcr c:un thirtk ol'tltc:ser otllor ltos-
srbilitics colloctivcly as urytltokrgic,irl roltttiotts to (itttr.:; itlttl wc will lintl, ilt
r'rlrsir.lc;ing WcrrrLrr l'lcrzog's 20 l0 tklc:utttctttitly li:itttttr' ('ttlt'ol littr'14ttllt'rt
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Dreants, that creating the conditions fbr placing or displacing the viewcr in a
mythr:logical relation to time is a natural pos$ibility tor the medium of 1ilm"
It is Lrecause the medium ol'film presents this possibilit_v thirt the documen-
tary nature of film can bo understood not as a means of preservation but as a
mcdium ol trunsfiguration.
Cave ofForgoften Dreums, perhaps best known lor its use of 3D technol-
ogy to lilm prehistoric cave pairrtings lbund in 1994 in Chauver Cave, in the
Golges dc I'Arrl0che region ol'sonthern France, seems to pose the question:
What are we to do with a vision of our collective ancestors that is somehow
both induhitahle and unfathomable, evidence o{'the kind oI lact that makes
time itself spin'/ The cave paintings, as revealed by radiocarbon dating, were
created as far back as 32,000 years ago. Painted on unciulating cave walls,
they register with us immediately for their striking verisimilitude, their depic-
tit"rns of mostly large (and fbr us, oflen extinct) animal species. Bur these
paintings insist as well that we take up not only their beauty of depiction
but the humanly or creaturely life that surrounded them and brought thewr.
to tile. How rnight we do that? One answer*-ler us label it the scientific
answer-is represented in the film hy thc charrning circus-perfbrmer-turned-
archaeologist, Julien Monney, who, prompted oIl'camera hy Herzr:g, says:
"Delinitely, we will ncver know [their thoughts and dreams], hecause Ithe]
past is definitely liist. We will never reconstruct the past. We can only create
a ropresentation of what exists now, today."28Herzog's Iilnr seems attracted
at tirst to this humble assessment of the archaeologist's project of building a
hridge to the pasf; shurtly after Monney's remarks, Herzog as narrator asks,
"Will we ever be able to understand the vision of the artists aL:ross such an
abyss of tims'/"2eBLrt roughly an honr into thc lilm, about the time we meet
the mildly eccentric prolbssional perlumer, Maurice Marin, the narrative
changes. We see Marin, in the cave, conclucle a lengthy speoch by saying
(and it may be, as in any Herzog documentary. that the author o1'these wrtrds
is not the speaker but Herzog): "The presence ol thcir livcs, meaning hurnt
wood, resins, the odors of everything fiom the natural worlcl that surruuntis
[his cave-r.ve can go back with our irnagination." Herzclg in voice-over then
erdorses and supplements the thought these words express: "With his sense
of wonder, the cave transf'orms into an enchanted world of the imaginary
where tirne and space lose their meaning."3() "Ihis thought becomcs the film's
touchstone in its response to the fact t'rf the Chauvet Cave paintings. The sci-
entific perspective is embraced throughout the lilni not clespite but because
o{'its conclusions, which are inconclusive:]1; the perspcctivc f'rorn wonelcr--it
matters little whethe r we label it philosophic or cincma(ic wondcr--"is irt oncc
rhc film's perspective ancl its gclal.
We see the insidc ol'ClhuLrvcl. Cavr: intorrnitlcntly ilLrrirrg lhc first Lwcnty-
thrcc rninLtl.cs ol'l{crzog's lilnr. ()n$ tuLrnt()t'irh[: slrr:lc:lr ol lixrtlgr:, lirslirrg
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almost fbur minutes, is inaugurated when Jean Ck:tt.es, the f'ormer dircctol
ol research at Chauvet Cave, asks fbr silence fiom the scientists and crcw
so that they might listen to the cave interior. While they (and we) are takirrp
in the silence lhat is brr:rken only by the sound of water dripping, lhc sorrrrtl
track gives way to a human hearlbeat.3'As is not uncornmon ior thc holllh\r
human heart, it heats in sync with each passing second one by one, orrr: lirl
one; it rneasures the steady passage of tirne that we share with tlro livirrg
lruman ligures on the screen heltrre us, despite our metaphysical clistiurcc
['rom them. We see their attentive looking and listening as wo listcn iutrl lool'
ourselves. The heartlreat also stands in lbr exactly how much, or how littlt:.
wc have in common wilh those who slood and Iistened in th;r[ sanlcr ('it\/(.
sornc 32.000 years earlier. Thc human l'aces we see are posing ir rltrcstiorr
to the walls of the cave: the lilm is olfuring us the experiencc ol'it tn-yst(rt'.y.
llut the heartbeat can feel loisted on us. Perhaps it is simply too cirlly irr tlrr.
film tbr the sense ol the uncanny, f'or the enchanted rvorlcl ol'thc irrrrrpirrirly.
to take hold.
I1'tht: heartheat--as an emblem of both the passing scconcls irnll {.hc: rlislrrrrl
rlillenttia-comes too soon, then what about its reappeariurccr n(rir tlrc r'rrrl
ol' Cave of Forgottert Drecmts? In the inlervening timc, wc hirvc srrr.rr rurtl
hcard multiple interviews, learned about the bionrass in Palcolitlric Iiunrl:c,
lrccn shown ligurine specimens and ancient flutes, witncssccl a clontorrstltr(iorr
ol'Paleolithic hunting techniques, and bcen guidecl through nnrlti;rlc toLrls
ol'tlre cave. Bu[ now there fbllows a singular strel.uh <ll'l.imc---lirstiltg ovu'
scvcn minutes-when Herzog halts his narration and paraclc ol'cxpcrls. irrrrl
wc hear only the lilm's ethereal musical score ancl, at onc point wlrclt llrc
rrtrrsic lades clut, the return o1'the human heartheat, What wc scc oll sct'(:('lt
is a sequence of hirndhelcl shots, either still or slowly panning shots, ol'tlrc
irtturior of Chauvet Cave. These shots return us to the sarnc stutic. uncl nrrw
l'ruliliar, prchistoric cave imagcs that wcre introcluced at carlicl intc,r'virls irr
tlrr'l [ilrri. Almost invariably, each shot olrens with an in situ ladc-in, hcgirrrrinl'
in elarktrcss as the handhclcl I-ED light-panels are tLlrncd skrwly towrrrtl tlrt'
t'rtvc wirll being [ilnrecl, as il'each paintcd surl itcc is grantcd its orvrr rlitr,vuirrp,
ol irllowcd t() posc il.s own riddlo. Thc nrovcmcnt ol'thc light pancrls llrrvirlcs(lro only animation, othcr than thc carncra's occasiolral panning iutrl (trs it
rirronrs) its paticnt absorlltion.rtr
(iivcrr thc qLrickening pucc ancl incrcased optical chungc in lxrptrlirr lilrrrs
ol rcccttt clccaclos,r'l l{crzog's lilm is burclcne:cl aI oncc with roc:ogrrizirrg irrrtl
It'rrtlittg ol'l'thc Ilrrcnt thlt aucliorrccs will laugh, ()l'yilwn, rrt (lrr: lrrxuriorrs
litno tlcvolotl lo tltcsc tll-hrrt-still sltots ol'r:avc:1'lirintirrgs. Iltrt lturglrtcl irrrrl ils
rrripinirting itttxicty iro l'lrtnililt'r'csl)olrscs to tlrc rrrrrrirrirliolrs ol'plrilosoplry
its tvr"rll. Ilow is i1 so rurrclt irs llossiblc: lllrl srrclr itrlrp,cs lrolrl orrr irrlr"n"sl'/
,'\nrl why, s;rc11lq,i11g lirl rrtyscll tr( lctrsi, rlo Ilrtrsc rrrostl.y slirlit'irrr;r1,1'5 slrlisly
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a longing that Cave af fr'orgotten l)yeams itself creates in us-an el'fect not
unrelated to the thumping, throbbing climax of an action movie? My sense is
that Herzog constmcts this concluding segment <tt Cave oJ'Forgotteru Dreams
to be expericnced (if not as what he would call an "ecstatic truth," then) as an
intervai o1'ecsltatic contemplation.35 There is something ahout the contempla-
tion o{'the expansiveness of time and of our place in it, occasioned by roughly
every other shot in Herzog's film, that can strike the viewer as revealing the
incongruousness and absurdity of human existence itself. A moment's con-
sideration of the hard tacts-fbr instance, that my father's lile, just short of
ninety-seven ye ars, would be scarcely visible at the end of a three-meter time-
line representing the years from Chauvet Cave to his death, an interval of time
itsell dwarfed by the billions of years lhat rnodern cosmology places r:n either
side of that interval 
-and we see why a filmgoer's nervous recponse to thismismatch of scale might be to laugh the absurdiry away. And yet Herzog's
film, over the course of its preceding seventy-five minutes, has provided all
the materials we need to experience a response other than nervous laughter.
Like Freemasons prepared fbr initiation, we arrive at the end of the filn, well-
equipped to meditate on mysteries.
If the specific narrative aim of Cave of Irorgatten Dreams is to place us
outside our ordinary, immersed, unrellective relation to time-to set up the
conditions f'or imagining ourselves straddling time so as to contemplate other
possibilities of our relation to it or placement in it-it is also the concern ol'
the film to acknowledge this aspiration for the medium of film generally" One
way to begin measuring the truth of this claim is to observe Herzog's fascina-
tion with the cinematic possibilities of the cave paintings and the torrn of lif'e
that once surounded ther:r. He asks us to "note" that one of the cave artists
painted a bisnn with eight legs, "suggesting movement-almost a f'orm of
proto-cinema"; and a rhino nearby "seems also to have the illusion o1'move-
ment, like fiames in an animated fi1m,":]6Herzog appears most delighted with
speculation about what the evidence of a row of lires in Chauvet Cave tells us
about the aboriginal experience of'the cave and its paintings. As he explains
in an interview:
And when you loclk at the cave, and there are certain panels, there's evidence
of sorne fires on the grourrd. They were not lbr cooking, They were-because
there's no evidence of any habitation in there*-they were used tbr illumination.
You have to step in front of these fires to look at the irnages. And, of course,
when you move yoLI must see your own shadow.r?
When these speculations are introcttced in [{orzog's film they irnmediatoly
give way to the most cxtraordinary tnd ek:lightl'r"rlly irrcongruous sequcncc irr
thc docurncntary: wc aro shown the irnagc ol'lircrd Astirirc r.lancing wit.h thrcc
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of his shadows, a scene fiom the 1936 rnusical cometly swing "fime,'r"his
dance sequence, Astaire's tribute to the African-American clancer known as
Boiangles (Bill Rotrinson) and perl'ormed hy Astaire in muted black lircc, is
often remembered by film critics (e.g., in Roger Ebert's 1998 review articlc)tH
fbr the way it ends.The three slradr:w dancers eventually become exhaustcd
and break out oi sync with Astaire, unable to keep up with him, ancl Astlirr.r
dances a kind of victory lap by himsel{' before he walks orf coolly and (ri-
umphantly; we are nol shown that conclusion in Herzog's exccrpl" ol'thr:
sequenco.
The conclusion o1 this dance seqltence in Swing Time, howcvcr, is srr
memorable that critics typically misremember who breaks clr"tt ol'syne wilh
whom frsr, thinking that the shadows are the {irst to stop, to oxhurs( (lrrr
impulse to dance. But Herzog's film gives us exactly l.hat port.iorr ol'llrrr
soquence where things first break down, which he descrihes witlr lrotlr pruci-
sion and admiration in the interview quoted earlier: "It is actually, ilrgrrlhly
or for me, certainly the greatest single sequence in all ol'film history: l,rcrtl
Astaire dancing with his own shadows, and all of a sudclen lrc stops rurrl thrr
shadows hecome independent and dance withor-rt him anci ho has to r:irrclr
Lrp with them.r mean it's just so quintessential movic. lt can't ho, it clrn't
got firore lreautilul.":re Describing this Fred Astaire sequencc ts "ccr.(uinly
thc greatest singie sequence in all of fllm history" is, arguahly or lirr rntr,
something more than mere Herzogian hypcrbole. cavell" in "Frcd Astuircr
Asserts the Right to Praise," reminds us that "the origin ol clancing" is ..irr
ocstasy."a{rAnd in "something out ol'the ordinary" hc charactcrizcs lilrrr
as "the art which replaces living human beings hy photographic shadows ol'
thcmse lves."at A shadow is not typicaliy a shadow ol'sornethingpa,r/--"unlikr.r
a mummy, a death mask, or a shrerud, metaphors with which, as noted at tlrc
ontsct, Andrd Bazin describecl 11lm's lineage in realism. The clancing shacl-
ows sequence fiom sw,ing Tirue as recounted and as borrowed by Hcrzrlg
carns his high praise in part by serving as an emhlcm o1'what hoconrcs ol'
things on lilm. Toput it ruinimally, things on I'ilnr have an cxistencc nol..iust
indcpendent of but extending in time bettond the timc o['thc thirrgs [ilnrs{.
Frcd Astaire stops, but his shadows dance on, and raptuxrrrsly: trrcy ltnow
that thc dance now lrelongs to them. And it rnattcrs that whcn Astnirc stops,
hc is turnccl toward us (i.c., tclwetrcl our scroen nnd away ll.onr his), und so is
ur)ilwarc that thc shadows continuc on without him.''r2Thc soquonoc is thus rro
lcss an cmhlcm o1'what bccorncs o['things filrrrecl: l"'rccl Astlilc is ilcird, Iong
livc his slradows.
So would it hc sirnplcr, as yor,r might t.hinl<, [rl roacl l-lcrzog's ine:lrrsion ol'
tlto sorluoncc li"oln.lu,ln,('l'ima, utd tho signi(iclnco ol'(ltne tl'liot.ll(,tt(n
L)x'ums gcncrnlly, as a stlitightlilt'wrrel nrcditat.ion on hunrirn ol elcru(urr:ly
tttortitlily itntl (hc (or I'lcrzttg's) wislt to rk:lt"rirl it'/ Why ckr I rkrsr:rilrrr IL:r.z69's
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{ihn as ot-fbring viewers tlre possibility of escaping a fatalist view not o{'the
.futwre but of lhe present'? I conclude with two sorts of answer:(1) Everyone, as I imagine, and as I imagine Herzog imagines, can f'eel the
incongruity in the film's juxtaposition o1'a discussion of Paleoiithic humans
casting their shadclws on the images of Chauvet Cave with tlre image o1'shad-
ows dancing in sync with Fred Astaire. One rnight suppose, however, that the
incongruity lies in the incongruity ol the times juxtaposed*time periods that,
as it were, lic in gppr:site regions of one 's consciousness. It helps in that case
to be reminded that the two times or epochs that are juxtaposed in Herzog's
sequence are not 32,000 years ago and the year 1936. This is because (a) there
is not scrrne event of 32,000 years ago that the comparison to the sequence from
Swing T'ime is asking us to acknowledge, and because (b) Fred Astaire's danc-
ing with his shadows is not an evenl of the year 1936. Rather, each is a film
event-that is, an episode whose relation to tts is captured by nothing more nor
iess than its tense, an event indeterminately or mythically in tihe past. Cave af
Forgotten Drea.ms, notwithstanding The l{istory Channel's role in iLs produc-
tion, is not an attem pt ta docwment a time or a pe ople of the delerminate past"
The {ilm offbrs, rather, one set of conditions for the possibility of an experi-
ence, what I have been calling (following Emerson and Thoteau) an experi-
ence of douhieness and (fbllowing Cavell) a rnythological relatian to time.
(2) A Iinal explanation fbr why one should read Cave af Forgotten Dreams
as inviting, ilot an escape fiom the present, but an escape from our ordinary
or latalist view ol it, can be gleaned frt:m Hcrzog's title. We are not trlld over
the course o1'the {ilm who is dreaming in the cave or, cotsequently, whose
dreams have been forgotten. But we can ask the director ol Fitzcurraldo'
.{t the end of Herzog's turn-of-Lhe-millennium commentary to the DVI)
rerelease of Fitzcarruklo (.t982), a [ilm possihly best remembered tbr the
demands of the fiim shoot (which included the pulling of an actual ship over
a mountain-neither a model ship nor one created by animation or CGI),
Herzog is asked whether he regrets the time and pain that the film exacted.
While his answer is unsurprising-it is, in a word, No-Herzog recounts his
telling others at the time, "[f I abandon this I would he a man without drearns.
And I iust do not want to live as someone who has dropped aud disconnected
from his own dreams."43 As the human heartbeat fades fi'om the sound track
in Cave o!'Forgotten Dreams, we hear the narrator intone, "These images are
memories of iong-forgotten dreams. is this their heartbeat, or ours'?"aa We are
invited to consider that the dreams thal have been ftrrgotten are not those that
were dreamt in the Paleolithic past; and wc are wclcome to ctlncludc that the
dark but illuminated cave that contains fbrgottcn dreams is uot somewherc in
southeru Francc hut surrounc{s us likc a movio thcittcr-is" irr lact, a nr<lvic
theatcr-that awaits, in Wcil's lrtvcly plrrasc, oLrr upplying to tlrc prcscttt thc
point ol'(lrat clcsirc within tts v,ihir-:h cttrl'cspontls trl lirtllity.
Thc Ecsktsl, oJ' Time'lruvel
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